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Normative models of the optimal use of sanctions, monetary as well as nomnonetary, that 
employ the assumption of precommitment on the part of social authorities provide an important and 
useful benchmark for the evaluation of existing policies. Ever since Gary Becker published his 
classic article on the economics of crime (Becker, 1968), however, a conundrum has plagued the 
literature: if law enforcement is costly but crimes are socially undesirable and potentially deterrable, 
then efficiency requires that for all crimes the probability of apprehension be set arbitrarily low and 
the sanction arbitrarily high (see, e.g., Carr-Hill and Stem, 1979). This solution imposes no costs on
society as long as the expected sanction is high enough to deter all crime; since no crime is ever 
committed, the sanction never need be imposed. Hence, even if sanctions are costly to impose--e.g. 
in the case of nomnonetary sanctions-this is the efficient solution. 
---------"fT"w"'o.-ce"'a"'r!yattempts m the modem literature to find an explanation for nontrivial criminal 
sanctions (i.e., sanctions which vary systematically with such factors as the level of harm) were 
offered by Becker in his original article and, later, George Stigler ( 1970). Becker proposed including 
in the social calculus the value of the gain to offenders from engaging in proscribed behavior. S!igler 
re-introduced the notion of marginal deterrence to the modem literature. The idea of marginal 
deterrence is quite simple in principle-if an offender is to be punished the same for, say, armed 
robbery and murder, there is no incentive not to commit murder during an armed robbery. At the 
margin, there is no deterrent to inflicting on society the additional harm associated with murder 
given that armed robbery has already been committed. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that marginal deterrence is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for nontrivial criminal sanctions. In the process, I will consider several specific examples, 
and will, for these examples, identify when marginal deterrence does play a role. 
The basic formulation of my model follows closely that of Shavell ( 1987). In particular, 
social welfare is defined to be the social value of the private benefits obtained from engaging in 
proscribed behavior, minus the harm inflicted, the costs of apprehension and the costs of imposing 
sanctions. The social authorities choose sanctions and an allocation of resources to apprehension so 
as to maximize social welfare. I also assume the existence of nondeterrables, which requires that 
sanctions be bounded above. The new element in my model is a richer set of proscribed behaviors 
from which potential offenders choose tl1eir actions ai.1d, consequently, a n1ore complex set of 
relationships between resources allocated to apprehension and probabilities of apprehension. 
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In section II, I specify a general two-crimes model, and demonstrate that the socially
optimal set of sanctions and allocation of resources to apprehension typically requires different 
sanctions for each crime, one of which must equal the maximum possible sanction. When the 
allocation of resources is fixed, the optimal sanction associated with the other crime is always 
increasing in the level of harm associated with that crime and decreasing in the level of harm 
associated with the first crime. When the allocation of resources to apprehension is allowed to adjust 
optimally in response to changes in harm levels, however, the relationships between optimal 
sanctions and changes in harm levels become ambiguous in general. 
In section III, I show that in my model a nontrivial optimal sanctions policy depends 
crucially on a notion of nonseparability in the costs of apprehension. In particular, if the
probabilities of apprehension for the two crimes can be controlled separately, and the total allocation 
of resources to apprehension is simply the sum of resources allocated to such crime, then the optimal 
sanction for each crime will be the maximum possible sanction. The reasoning is, of course, well 
known, and is essentially the same as the reasoning behind the Becker conundrum. 
In section IV, I consider a special case that focusses on a classic example of the need for 
marginal deterrence. In particular, the general two-crimes model is applied to the case of armed
robbery and murder in the commission of armed robbery. Private benefits are assumed to be the 
same for either act, but social harm is greater for the latter and the probability of apprehension lower 
(because, say, the murder victim is a witness). In this case the optimal sanction for armed robbery is
always less than the optimal sanction for murder in the commission of armed robbery, the latter 
which equals the maximum possible sanction. As the harm associated with armed robbery increases, 
the overall allocation of resources to apprehension increases, but the optimal sanction for murder in 
-------m,e-connnissimrur-arrned robbery mcreases 1f and only 1! a natural cond1t10n on the apprehens10n 
technology is satisfied. 
In section V, I consider another example in which it might be expected that marginal 
deterrence would play a role in the optimal enforcement and sanctions policy, simple assault versus 
aggravated assault. Private benefits for aggravated assault are assumed to be greater than for simple 
assault by a constant factor for all potential offenders. Social harm also is assumed to be greater for 
aggravated assault than for simple assault but the probability of apprehension the same. In this case 
the optimal sanction for for aggravated assault is al ways the maximum possible sanction. The 
optimal sanction for simple assault will be strictly less than this if and opJy if social harm levels 
differ by at least the same factor as private benefits; otherwise marginal deterrence plays no role. 
In section VI, I briefly compare these results to the existing literature, and offer some 
observations regarding the implications of the results and possible future work. 
II. THE MODEL
In this model potential offenders can choose to commit one of two proscribed acts or neither, 
but not both. Thus the following variables are defined for i = l, 2:1
b; = private benefits from a harmful act, 
h; = harm caused by the act, 
Pi = probability of apprehension, 
si = sanction, 
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cr = proportionality factor in cost of imposing sanctions, and
r = total resources allocated to apprehension.
Assumption 1: s E [0, s ]: sanctions are bounded above bys.
Assumption 2: (bi .b2) -f (b i.b2): private benefits are distributed via joint density f ( · , · ). 
Assumption 3: Pi = g, (r ) , where g, (0) = 0, g;' > 0 and g," < 0 for i = 1, 2.
Assumption 1 follows Shaven (1985, 1987). Assumption 2 is obvious, but Assumption 3 
requires comment. Fundamentally it reflects a kind of nonseparability, or jointness, in the 
production of criminal apprehension rates. It presumes that if a given amount of resources are 
devoted to law enforcement, then some of these resources are allocated to fixed costs which must be 
incurred regardless of which proscribed behavior society attempts to control. In this case, g i( · ) and 
g2( ·) are "reduced form" apprehension rates which come from a maximizing process associated
with optimal behavior by the law enforcement agency. In this paper I take these apprehension rates
as given, although an obvious line of research is to make them endogenous.
Assumption 4: hi< h2: social harm for crime 1 is less than crime 2.
Assumption 4 is really just a matter of notation, although it provides a convenient way to
resolve indifference. In particular, for given probabilities of apprehension and sanction levels sin=------- ·­
potential offenders are restricted to committing one crime or none, they behave according to the 
following rule: 
bi $pisi andbz$pz s2 
if bi >pisi andbz$bi - pisi +p2s2 
bz > pz Sz and bi< b2 -pzsz + p isi 
j commit no crime 
then commit crime 1 
commit crime 2 
In (1), indifference is resolved in favor of the crime with the lowest social harm (crime 1). 
Social welfare is defined to be the social value of the private benefits obtained from 
engaging in proscribed behavior minus the harm inflicted, the costs of imposing sanctions and the 




where p 1 = g 1(r )  and p 2 = g2 (r ). The social problem is to choose sanction levels and an allocation
of resources to apprehension so as to maximize W (s 1 ,s2,r ) . The optimal values are denoted
s i* ,  sz*, and r*.
Proposition 1: Given Assumptions 1-3, if r' > 0 then optimal sanctions have the following
properties:2 
(a) At least one optimal sanction must equals. The other optimal sanction may equal s or 
it may be strictly less than s. 
(b) If the allocation of resources to apprehension is fixed and the optimal sanction
associated with a crime is less than s, then it is increasing in the level of harm 
associated with that crime and decreasing in the level of harm associated with the other 
crime. 
(c) If the allocation of resources to apprehension is allowed to adjust optimally to changes 
in harm levels, and the optimal sanction associated with a crime is less than s, then the
relationship between it and either harm level is ambiguous in general. 
The formal proof ofthis proposition is given in the appendix, but it can be explained easily. 
Suppose both sanctions are less than the maximum feasible sanction. Inspection of W (s 1,s 2 ,r )  
reveals that social welfare only depends on expected sanctions, p 1 s  1 and p2s2 ; nowhere do s 1  or s2 
appear in any other form than multiplicatively with p 1 and p 2 respectively. Meanwhile, if r = 0,
sanctions are irrelevant. Thus it must be that r > 0, and consequently so are p 1 and p 2. In this case,
however, since s 1 and s2 are less than s, it is possible to lower r and increase both s 1 a.Tld s2 but hold
------p·tt�1s�1�ar1·c17Y2siwnsram�1mrsrim:rem;l)-,;octaI we1fare-:-Eveimra:llye1tl!er s 1 ors 2 lltts s, the 
maximum feasible sanction. Further decreases in r will increase the remaining sanction, until either
a balance between marginal social gains and losses has been achieved with the remaining sanction 
less than s, or after it too hits s. In the latter case expected sanctions will still differ across the two 
crimes, but only due to differences in the probability of apprehension; the sanction imposed given 
apprehension will be the maximum feasible sanction for either crime. In other words, marginal 
deterrence will not play a role. 
The comparative statics results with respect to harm levels are less obvious, but not
unintuitive. If resources allocated to apprehension are held constant, an increase in the harm 
associated with a crime will increase the optimal sanction associated with it so long as the increase 
in harm increases the marginal gain from higher sanctions on the crime; e.g., for crime i, say, so
long as Ws;h; is positive. This will always be the case, however, since the higher the harm associated
with a crime, the greater the social gain from deterring it. On the other hand, if one considers s;*, 
say, and lets hj increase (where i ;e j ), thens;* will decrease so long as W,.h. is negative. This,
' I
again, will always be the case since the higher the harm associated with crime j, the more society 
would prefer potential offenders to commit crime i and thus the lower the marginal social gain to
increases in s; . 
Finally, these comparative statics results become ambiguous when the allocation of 
resources to apprehension is allowed to adjust optimally to chai1ges in hai--m levels. As is shown in 
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the appendix, a sufficient condition for ds;*ld h; > 0 and d s;*ldhj < 0 is W,,, < 0 (for 
i = 1, 2 and j � i ). But this condition has no obvious economic interpretation in the general model. 
III. JOINTNESS IN THE PRODUCTION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
The model of section II has three central elements: (1) the existence of nondeterrables (and 
the boundedness of sanctions); (2) the need for marginal deterrence (the consideration of a spectrum 
of crimes and potential offenders' choices of an optimal crime, or no crime, from this spectrum); and 
( 3) jointness in the production of law enforcement. In this section I demonstrate first that (3 ) is 
necessary. 
Assumption 3': p 1 =g 1(r1), p2  = g2(ri> and r = r1 + r2, where g; (0) = 0, g;' > 0 and g;'' < 0 for 
i = 1, 2.
Proposition 2: Given Assumptions l, 2, and 3', if ri > 0 and r� > 0 then optimal sanctions have the 
following properties:3 
(a) Both optimal sanctions must equals. 
(b) If the allocation of resources to apprehension is fixed and the optimal sanction 
associated with a crime is less than s, then it is increasing in the level of harm 
associated with that crime and decreasing in the level of harm associated with the other 
crime. 
The formal proof of this proposition is again given in the awendix, but the logic behind th 
result is similar to that behind Proposition 1. The essence of Assumption 3' is that p 1 and p 2 can be 
set independently. Social welfare still only depends on expected sanctions though. Thus, if either s 1 
or s 2  is less than s, social welfare can be increased by lowering r1 orr2  (and thus p 1 or pi) and 
raising s 1 ors 2 so as to hold p 1 s  1 and p 2s 2 constant. In this way, a constant level of deterrence is 
achieved at a lower social cost in terms of resources allocated to apprehension. If, however, 
r 1 and r2  are fixed in such a way that either s r* or sf is Jess thats, then the comparative statics of 
changes in h 1 or h2 are identical to those given in Proposition l, part b.4 
To be fair, there is a kind of marginal deterrence present in the optimal policy even when 
enforcement costs are separable in the sense of Assumption 3'. Actual sanctions for both crimes will 
bes, but the optimal expected sanctions,p ts and pfs, will differ. It is still the case, however, that 
all offenders who are apprehended, regardless of their crime, will receive the maximum possible 
sanction. 
IV. MARGINAL DETERRENCE: Example 1
In this section I consider the following classic example of the need for marginal deterrence 
in an optimal enforcement and sanctions policy. Suppose a potential offender chooses between two 
crimes, (1) armed robbery and (2) murder in the commission of armed robbery. Assume the benefit 
to the offender is the same for either crime, but that killing a witness (for example the victim of the 
robbery) reduces t11e probability of apprehension. Assume also that murder in the commission of 
armed robbery generates greater social harm than armed robbery alone. The next proposition shows 
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that under these assumptions, murder in the commission of an armed robbery should receive the 
greater sanction (equal to the maximum feasible sanction) and that armed robbery should receive a 
lesser sanction. Furthermore, the latter sanction will increase in the level of harm associated with 
armed robbery if and only if a natural condition on g 1 and g 2 holds.
Proposition 3: Suppose, given Assumptions !, 3 and 4, that h 1 < h2,g1 (r) > gz (r) for all
r > 0 and b1 = b = b2• Let b be distributed via the density f (b ). If r' > 0 then optimal sanctions
have the following properties: 
(a) The optimal sanction for murder in the commission of armed robbery equals s. The 
optimal sanction for armed robbery is strictly less than s. 
(b) The sanction for armed robbery increases in the harm associated with armed robbery if 
and only if g 2(r )/ g 1 (r) is increasing in r. 
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 3, supposes i* = s. In this case, all potential offenders
must prefer crime 2 to crime 1 since the sanction on it cannot be higher than the sanction on crime 1 
and the probability of apprehension is lower. The logic of the Becker conundrum then implies 
s 1 = s as well. But if s z* = s, then for a fixed allocation of resources to apprehension, the social
authorities can lowers i* until potential offenders are indifferent to committing either crime. Since 
indifference is resolved in favor of the less harmful crime, this will make society better off. Hence if 
s2* = s, it must be thats 1* < s. One sanction must equals, though, so the optimal structure of
sanctions requires s i* < s = sz*. In fact, s 1* = g2(r*)slg 1 (r *): expected sanctions must be equal
given indifference between the crimes and equal private benefits. 
----------Aoc'e-i:ttresta1Jtistlel:lrhat s i* gz(r*)s/g 1(r*), part (b) or me propos1t10n follows d!fectiy. 
In general, the optimal allocation of resources to apprehension always increases in harm levels. 
Hence dr*ld h 1 > 0. Whether the sanction on crime 1 increases in the harm level associated with it
thus depends entirely on how increases in r* affect g2(r*) versus g 1 (r* )--the "apprehension gap." If
an increase in r * increases the proportional apprehension gap thens 1* must fall when h 1 rises to
keep potential offenders indifferent to the two crimes. If, as is more natural, an increase in r * 
d ecreases the proportional apprehension gap, thens i* must rise as the pressure for marginal
deterrence decreases. 
In some respects, this example of the role of marginal deterrence in an optLrnal enforcement 
and sanctions policy preserves some of the desirable but unrealistic attributes of the original 
Becker/Stigler formulation. Under the optimal policy the maximum possible sanction is applied to a 
crime which never occurs. Thus society never bears the costs of imposing it. At the same time, the 
crime which is committed by some offenders receives a lesser sanction which varies positively with
the degree of social harm inflicted by that crime if g 2(r )/ g 1 (r) is decreasing in r. 
V. MARGINAL DETERRENCE: Example 2 
A second example of the need for marginal deterrence in an optimal enforcement and 
sanctions policy involves crimes where the private benefits to offenders differ in a systematic \vay, 
but where differential apprehension rates are not an issue. For example, suppose a potential offender 
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is contemplating simple assault (crime 1) versus aggravated assault (crime 2). The probability of 
apprehension is approximately the same in either event, but both the private benefit and harm 
associated with the latter is greater than the former. In particular, let b 2 = ab 1 where a > 1 so that
for all potential offenders the private benefit of aggravated assault is greater than the private benefit 
for simple assault by a factor of (a -1). The next proposition shows that under these assumptions,
aggravated assault should receive the greater sanction (equal to the maximum feasible sanction) and 
that simple assault should receive the same sanction or, if a natural necessary and sufficient 
condition is satisfied, a lesser sanction. 
Proposition 4: Suppose, given Assumptions 1, 3, and 4, that g 1( r) = g2(r) for all r > 0 and 
b 2 = ab 1 where a > 1. Let b 1 be distributed via density f (b 1 ). If r' > 0, then optimal sanctions
have the following properties: 
(a) The optimal sanction for aggrevated assault (crime 2) equals s. 
(b) The optimal sanction for simple assault (crime 1) is equal to or less than s. A 
necessary and sufficient condition for si < s is ah 1 < h2. In this case si < sla.. 
The point of this example is to illustrate a case in which marginal deterrence may not be part 
of an optimal enforcement and sanctions policy. If ah 1 > h2, then any s1 E [ s/a, s] is optimal but
crime 1 is never committed. Only crime 2, which has the greater harm is committed. True marginal 
deterrence only plays a role if the difference in harm levels is high enough. In this case both crimes 
are committed, simple assault by offenders with b 1 E [ps 1, p ( s  -s 1 )/(a -1)) and aggravated assault 
by offenders with b1 E [p( s-s1)/(a-l),=J. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to develop a normative model of optimal sanctions in the 
Becker Tradition which emphasizes the role of marginal deterrence. The paper complements 
Shavell's 1987 American Economic Review paper, the essential difference being that Shavell's
model concentrates on variations in the sanction imposed within a single category of acts (a specific 
crime) while the model in this paper concentrates on variations in the sanction imposed across 
categories of acts (different crimes). The distinction is not just semantic, though; it is driven by 
whether potential offenders can choose the private benefit and social harm associated with various 
proscribed behaviors. Moreover, in the absence of allowance for some choice, any theory of optimal 
sanctions will require some offenders to receive the maximum possible sanction for every category 
of crime. 
In their most general formulations, neither Shavell's model nor the model developed in this 
paper yields the result that acts with greater social harm should receive greater sanctions. But 
special cases, which readers may or may not find reasonable, do yield that result, within crimes for 
both models and across crimes in the model developed in this paper. This paper has also identified 
the necessary condition of jointness in the cost of law enforcement in the case of comparisons across 
crimes.5 
It is i.rnpcrta11t to recognize th.at all ofu1 e results obtained in tltis paper apply to monetary 
sanctions as well as nonmonetary sanctions. It may, however, be possible to obtain additional results 
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for monetary sanctions since in the monetary sanctions model cr = 0. Shavell ( 1989b), in particular, 
compares monetary sanctions between a single-crime model and a two-crimes model, a comparison 
which is difficult for nonmonetary sanctions. 
Despite the rich set of results yielded by the simple model specified in this paper, one must 
be careful to recognize their limitations. As mentioned in the introduction, normative models in the 
Becker Tradition are important and useful as a benchmark for the evaluation of existing policies.
They have less value as an explanation of existing policies or a predictor of the effects of new 
policies, as I have argued elsewhere in the context of tax compliance (see e.g., Graetz, Reinganum 
and Wilde, 1986). From a positive point of view, precommitment is a very dubious assumption. 
Furthermore, even if the social authorities can precommit to an overall allocation of resources to 
apprehension, law enforcement agencies have a significant degree of control over how those 
resources translate into apprehension rates for specific crimes. In other words, we need a theory of 
how g 1 ( r) and g 2(r ) , to use the notation of this paper, are generated.
We also need a better understanding of the degree to which precommitment to a given 
sanctions policy is possible. Judges and juries, for example, have a great deal of control over 
sanctions, and it is difficult to bind these agents of society to prespecified sanctions policies. If one 
moves out of the Becker Tradition in this respect, however, motives other than deterrence must come 
into play (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986). In this case, even if the choice of sanctions is based 
entirely on considerations other than deterrence, the existence of positive sanction levels will imply 
some deterrent effect anyway. That a theory based only on deterrence can explain even a part of the 
criminal justice system may therefore be purely spurious. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition I: 





part (a): Clearly, from (A3), it cannot be the case that both s 1* and sz* are interior to [0, s], at least
one must equals or otherwise W, = -1 which cannot be part of an optimum (since it implies r* = 0).
It is possible, however that both s1* =sand sz* = s. 
part (b): The first order conditions for s j" ands z* are symmetric so suppose, without loss of
generality, thats I" E (0, 1 )  and sz* = s. Differentiating W,, = 0 totally with respect to s 1 and h 1
gives 
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Second-order-conditions ( which I assume to hold) require ClWs/Cls 1 < 0. The tenn in brackets is 
positive. Thus d s  f !dh 1 > 0 ifs f E (0, s). Differentiating Ws, = 0 totally with respect to s 1 and h2 
gives 
(A5) 
Thus it is clearly the case that ds i* I dh 2 < 0 if s i* E (0, S). 
part (c): Suppose again without loss of generality thats i* E (0, s) and sz* = s. Since sz* = s, Ws,
is irrelevant. Thus, to evaluate d s  i* /d h 1 and dr *ld h 1 we need to consider (Al) and (A3) only. 
Differentiating Ws = 0 and W, = 0 totally with respect to s 1, r, and h 1 gives' 
(A6) 
where double subscripts denote the obvious second partial derivatives, and 
(A7) 
The proof of part ( b) of this proposition has shown that Ws,h, > 0 and W,,h, < 0. 
------"'·eeorui-rder'""onditions iequire-marwr-s-, - , <�a� . �i15
,.(s� 1 - .�r�,"h�1') -c<"U�an;;cd,----
-----------------
Ws,s, <l> (s 1• r, h 1 )  -Ws,s,szgz' Ws,r > 0. Thus ds i* ld h 1 > 0 unambiguously only if Ws,r < 0. A 
similar results obtains for ds i* I d h  2: the sign of Ws , is crucial.' 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Social welfare is essentially as given in equation (2) except p 1 = g 1 (r1 ), p 2 = g2 (r z) and 




W,, = Ws,Sz gz'lgz - I. (A9) 
Clearly if S 1 E (0, S) Or Sz E (0, S) then r f = 0 or r'f = 0 respectively (Since W,, = 0 implies
W,, = -1 for i = 1, 2). Hence it must be that Ws, > 0 ands;*= s for i = 1, 2. This proves part (a).
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The proof of  part (b) is identical to  that given for part (b) of Proposition 1. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
By the hypothesis of the proposition, b1 = b = b1, h2 >hi. and g2( r) < g1( r) for all r > 0. 
In this case, since the private benefits are the same for both crimes, 
(A!O) 
where e; = g; ( r  )s; is the expected sanction on a crime of type i, and f ( · ) is the density of benefits. 
Note that indifference is resolved in favor of the less harmful act. 
Claim 1: si* =simplies sf = s. 
Proof of claim: Suppose s i* = s. Then since g 1 ( r) > g 2( r) for all r > 0,
g 1( r ) s  = g 1(r)s 1* > g2( r)s for all s E [0, s] and r > 0. Hence g 1( r*)s > g1( r*)sf, or e i* > ef, 
and W is given by the first branch of (A!O). But the standard argument used in this paper now 
implies sf = s.
Claim 2: sf = s implies s i* = s. 
Proof of claim: Consider W (s1, s, r) for r fixed. Define e2( r) = g2( r)s. Then W will be
maximized at some s i = s i ( r) ::; e 1 (r  )I g 1 ( r) since for s 1 > e z( r )! g 1 ( r) W is given by the first branch
of (A 10), which is independent of s 1. As s 1 falls to e 2( r )/ g 1 ( r) there is a discontinuous jump
upwards in welfare since the offender shifts to committing the first crime. Since e2( r  )I g 1 ( r) < s for
all r-g2( r) < g 1( r) for all r-it is certainly true at the optimal r that
st = s( r*)::; ez( r*)!g i( r*) <S. 
Together claims 1 and 2implys1* =s is impossible. Hence s2* = s (since one sanction must equal
s) ands 1* < s. This proves part (a). But one can say more.
Claim3: ei* =ef; i.e. ,si* =gz( r*)S !g1( r*). 
Proof of claim: Suppose e 1* < ef. Then W is given by the second branch (A!O). Thus it is 
possible to lower r* slightly, raises j" slightly and leave g 1 ( r*)s i* = e 1* unchanged. If r •is
lowered, g2( r*) falls, reducing ef = g2( r*)s. But, since e i* > ef, a small enough reduction in r* 
will keep W on the second branch of (A!O). Since e 1* is unchanged but r* falls, W must rise.
Therefore e i* = e f since e f > e i* cannot be optimal.
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Given Claims 1-3, the social authority's problem can be rewritten as
max f�C, '· [ b  - h1-crg1(r)s i] f( b)d b -rr,s1 81 ,u1 (Al 1)
Let A. be the multiplier associate with the constraint. Then first order conditions can be written as
-[g i(r)s1- h1-crg1(r)s i] f(g1(r)s1 )g1(r)= f�c ,_ crg1(r) f( b)d b +A.g1(r), (A12)g, r .r>1 
and 
Solving (A12) and (A13 ) for A. gives A.= -1/gz'(r )s. Thus, r* ands i* are given by
-[g1(r)s1 - h1 -crg1(r)siJ- f ,_ cr f( b )d b  = l!gz'(r)s (A14) 
g,(r,.., 1 
and 
substituting (A15) into (A14) gives a single equation for r*: 
-[gz(r*) s  - h 1 -crgz(r*) s] - r _cr f ( b ) d b  = l!gz'(r*)S.C2(r*)s 
(A15) 
(A16) 
Differentiating (A16) totally with respect tor* and h 1 gives, by second-order-<:onditions associated
with r*, that dr*ldh 1 > 0. Thus, from (Al5)
dsi* _ d[gz(r*)lg1(r*)] 
-- =S (dr*/dh)· d h1 dr (A17) 
Since dr*ld h > 0, the sign of d s  1* ld h 1 equals the sign of d[g2(r*)lg 1(r*)]ldr. This completes the
proof of part (b ). 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 4:
Using the behavioral rule specified in (!), b2=ah1 implies that
(Al8) 
where g 1 (r) = p = g 2(r) is the common probability of apprehension. The basic argument of this
paper implies thatsJ" =s,sf =s, or both. Supposes1* =s. Then 
max{p (s2 -s 1)/(cx -1), ps 1} = ps 1 and max{p s2 /cx, p (s2 -s 1)/(cx -1)} = ps ,;a. Hence
(A19) 
so that 
W, =(p'W,,s21p)-1. (A20) 
Oearly, W,, = 0 is impossible sos{ = s as well.
Suppose, then, thats{ = s. If max{p (s2 -s1)/(cx-I),ps 1} =psi> then it remains the case 
that only crime 2 is committed, so thats 1 is irrelevant. This condition reduces to s 1 > s/a. Thus, 
__
___ __._,,n,�e'-'nJ.J::eooeu;ds,_oUJnwl*y-ec.uonsirl er-rnimizirlg--W--with respeeHe-syc-�SJ* s la on this range, 
then only crime 2 is committed so any s1 e [s/cx, s] is optimal. The reformulated social problem is
J.
p(s-s,)l(a-1) 
max (b1 -h1 -aps1)f(b1) db1 
r � 0 psi 
OS:s1sS1a 
In this case, 
w, =-[
p(s - s 1) 
' cx-1 
r Clp(s-s1) 11 rl p(s -s1)J





w,,(s 1 = sla.) = [p !(a - I)J(cxh 1 
-
hiJf (psla.). 
Thus W,,(s J = S/Ct.) < 0 if and only if ah I < h2. 
Q.E.D. 
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FOOTNOTES 
• This work was supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant no. SES-8902545). It is 
adapted in substantial measure from Reinganum and Wilde (1986). I thank Prof. Reinganum
for her contributions but she bears no responsibility for opinions or conclusions stated herein, or
any errors or shortcomings of the analysis. 
1. The notation follows Shaven ( 1985) where possible. In that paper Shaven includes a weighting
factor, denoted by 13, which translates private benefits into social welfare. In this paper we
assume, without loss of generality, that 13 = 1. 
2. It is always possible that it is socially optimal to devote no resources whatsoever to 
apprehension. This could happen for example, if for i = 1,2, h; is close to zero, g, (0)=0, and 
g( O) is sufficiently large. I will not fonnally specify sufficient conditions for r' > 0 but instead 
will simply assume such conditions hold. 
3. As with r', I will simply assume sufficient conditions for ri > 0 and r; hold (see footnote 2).
4. There is no analogue to Proposition!, part c, because both s; ands; equals.
5. See Shavell (1989a) for a subsequent analysis of this point in the context of a single-crime




Becker, Gary. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." Journ al of Political Economy. 
76 (1968):169-217. 
Carr-Hill, R. A. and Stern, N. H. Crime, the Police and Crimin al Statistics (London, Academic
Press, 1979). 
Graetz, Michael; Reinganum, Jennifer; and Wilde, Louis. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an 
Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement." Journal of Law, Econ omics and Organ ization . 2 
(1986):1-32. 
Los An geles Times. "Court Fights Ahead over New Sentencing Rules." (April 8, 1988): 18.
Posner, Richard. "An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law." The Columbia Law Review. 85
(1985):1193-1231. 
Reinganum, Jennifer and Wilde, Louis. "Credibility and Law Enforcement." Social Science 
Working Paper no. 604. Pasadena: California Institute of Technology. April 1986. 
Reinganum, Jennifer and Wilde, Louis. "Nondeterrables and Marginal Deterrence Cannot Explain 
Nontrivial Sanctions." unpublished manuscript. California Institute of Technology. April 
1986. 
Shavell, Steven. "Criminal Law and the Optimal Use ofNonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent." 
Columbia Law Review. 85 (1985):1232-1262. 
Shavell, Steven. "The Optimal Use ofNonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent," American Econ omic 
Review. 77 (1987):584-592. 
Shavell, Steven. "Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law." Discussion Paper No. 58. 
--------iCambridge: Harvard Law School. June 1989a. 
Shavell, Steven. "A Note on Optimal Deterrence when Individuals Choose Among Harmful Acts." 
Discussion Paper No. 57. Cambridge: Harvard Law School, June 1989b. 
Stigler, George. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws." Journal of Political Econ omy. 78
(1970) :526-536. 
